Russia recognise independence of breakaways reigions South Ossetia and Abkhazia

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Medvedev backs independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has declared that Russia will recognise the independence of Georgia’s breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He made the announcement in Sochi following a unanimous vote for the republics’ independence by both houses of the Russian Parliament in Moscow on Monday.
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News
Bulent Kilic August 25, 2008, 15:46
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to follow in Kosovo's footsteps?
After Kosovo declared independence in February this year, Russia warned that other breakaway regions would follow suit. It now seems that the Pandora's box has been opened. The first regions to take the opportunity are Georgia's breakaway republics. The leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia immediately looked towards Moscow to demand the prize Kosovo had been granted by other countries.
Georgia had unsuccessfully attempted to bring the two regions under its control in by force in the early 1990s. A frozen conflict ensued, with Russian peacekeepers stationed in both regions.
Throughout this period the self-proclaimed republics held several referendums calling for full independence. The overwhelming majority voted to become separate sovereign states, but their will was not put into action. Now they hope to follow in Kosovo's footsteps.
Georgia doesn't want to let the two regions go for historical and territorial reasons. Georgia's president has offered the regions what he calls "broad autonomy", but after the recent invasion, Ossetians and Abkhazians may have little reason to trust the offer. The return of the breakaway regions has been one of Saakashvili's main aims since he came to power in 2003.
NATO membership is another ambition of the Georgian president, but unsettled territorial conflicts are a major obstacle.
Now Georgia's territorial integrity is being backed by countries which supported Kosovo's separation from Serbia. The EU envoy to the south
Caucasus, Peter Semneby, says: “I will not overemphasise and pay too much attention to parallels. Every conflict has its specific character”. However, the three regions share a common historical experience - a will to set up a state on their own and wars of independence with their
central governments.
Neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia will be part of Georgian state
25.08.2008 Source: AP
Russian lawmakers voted unanimously Monday to ask the president to recognize the independence of two unrecognized republics within Georgian borders, a move likely to anger the United States, the European Union and other Georgian allies.
The twin votes by the upper and lower houses of the Russian parliament came after intense fighting between Russia and Georgia over the two provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The votes were not legally binding and it was up to President Dmitry Medvedev to make the final call on diplomatic recognition. Still, experts say the blessing by lawmakers gives the Kremlin an extra bargaining chip in its dealings with the West as it tries to reassert influence in the
former Soviet republics and resist moves by Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.
"Today we must fulfill what is I think our historic mission - to defend small countries from aggressors," Federation Council member Boris Spiegel told Associated Press Television before the vote.
Currently, neither Russia nor any other member of the United Nations recognizes the two provinces' independence claims. Both won de-facto independence in the 1990s after wars with the Georgia, and have survived ever since with Russia's financial, political and military support.
"Neither Abkhazia ... nor South Ossetia will be part of the Georgian state," Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh told lawmakers Monday.
After Georgia tried to retake South Ossetia by force Aug. 7, Russian troops overwhelmed the Georgians, and for nearly two weeks occupied positions deep within Georgia. Most of those forces withdrew Friday, although some Russia troops continue to operate near the Black Sea
port of Poti and in Georgia outside the boundaries of the breakaway regions.
The fighting has brought relations between Russia and the West to a post-Cold War low, as Western nations accuse Russia of falling short of its commitment to withdraw forces from its smaller neighbor.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy is convening a special meeting of European Union leaders Sept. 1 to determine the next steps the 27-member bloc will take in terms of aid to Georgia and future relations with Russia. France holds the EU's rotating presidency.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, however, said Monday the EU was not considering any sanctions against Russia.
On Sunday, a U.S. Navy destroyer loaded with humanitarian aid reached Georgia's Black Sea port of Batumi, bringing baby food, milk, bottled water and a message of support for an embattled ally.
"The population of Georgia will feel more safe from today from the Russian aggression," Georgian Defense Minister David Kezerashvili told
The Associated Press on the aft missile deck of the USS McFaul after greeting U.S. Navy officers on shore. "They will feel safe not because the destroyer is here but because they will feel they are not alone facing the Russian aggression," he added.
The guided missile cruiser USS McFaul, carrying about 55 tons of humanitarian aid, is the first of three American ships scheduled to arrive this week.
A U.S. official said the American ship anchored in Batumi, Georgia's main oil port on the Black Sea, because of concerns about Russian damage to the Georgian port of Poti.
In central Georgia, a few miles west of the city of Gori, a fire tore through an oil train Sunday after an explosion, sending plumes of black smoke into the air. The cause was not clear, but Georgian officials have accused Russian troops of targeting their oil facilities and transport
links.
Georgia straddles a key westward route for oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other Caspian Sea nations, giving it added strategic importance as the United States and the European Union seek to decrease Russia's dominance of oil and gas exports from the former Soviet
Union.
Bush’s Unrealistic Response to Georgia Conflict
26.08.2008 Source: Pravda.
By Patrick Basham
“The New American Realism” is the title of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent article in Foreign Affairs, the influential policy journal. But there is little that is realistic about the American response to the conflict in the Caucasus.
Both President Bush and Republican presidential candidate John McCain are unambiguous in their condemnation of Russia’s military aggression and in their support of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. In domestic political terms, the crisis played into McCain’s hands
because he does “tough” so well. Unfortunately, “tough” is not the best move in this particular diplomatic chess match because it ignores two realities.
First and foremost, the U.S. is in neither a political nor a logistical position to expend blood and treasure in Russia’s backyard. Tuesday’s emergency meeting of NATO ministers begs the question, what can NATO actually do about the Georgia conflict? Beyond bold rhetoric and
diplomatic gesturing that won’t bother Moscow, there is really very little than NATO can do.
If we could do something, there is an obvious, tangible downside to Western action against Russia. If relations between Russia and the West are disrupted, the West would suffer, for example, on the security side of the equation. Russian participation is integral to a number of security measures, including counterterrorism policy and assistance in dealing with the Iranian regime.
Second, any American action, be it diplomatic or military, reeks of hypocrisy. The U.S. repeatedly rallied to the cause of self-determination in circumstances where separatism and independence constituted a political blow to Moscow. In stark contrast, the U.S. clearly does not
bestow upon South Ossetians and Abkhazians the same right to self-determination as it does Kosovars and Chechens.
A cynic might suggest that the U.S. reaction reflects no more than a longstanding (and questionable) desire for Georgian membership in NATO, a desire reinforced by the Georgian military’s noteworthy service in Iraq. At least that reasoning possesses the advantage of
consistency.
The Georgian government’s ill conceived attempt to restore control over South Ossetia provided Russia with a ready-made excuse both to defend its natural supporters in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to stress the larger point that Russia is the preeminent power in this region.
Russia 's unwillingness to back off is unquestionably distasteful and, from a strategic vantage point, arguably unnecessary. However, it is entirely predictable given Moscow's worldview.
The American reaction to Russia’s intervention in Georgia was intended to persuade Russia to step away from the conflict. The sad irony is that US ignorance of the nature of its Russian adversary, combined with a crude rhetorical delivery, contributed to Moscow's decision to take
further steps in the direction of Tbilisi.
At this point, could any U.S. action really prove productive—either for mitigating the violence in Georgia or for repairing relations with Russia?
First, the Bush Administration could swallow hard and recognize, at least implicitly, the inherent inconsistency in its position regarding South
Ossetia and Abkhazia’s respective futures. That, of course, is not altogether likely.
Second, Dr. Rice could then offer the Russians some of what they really want: a commitment to pursue an international agreement on the preconditions for self-determination that would bind both the U.S. and Russia to a common metric for resolving these kinds of disputes.
The Russians may find such an offer irresistible on public relations grounds alone. Consequently, such an apparently constructive American offer may actually incentivize Russia to pull her troops back within the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, at least temporarily.
However, the potential for an acceptable diplomatic conclusion to events in Georgia will diminish exponentially if, out of this crisis, the Bush administration seeks a larger diplomatic victory over Russia. A deeply unsatisfactory draw is the best anyone in the West can realistically hope
for.
Russia is clearly a very irritating—but, in truth, a very manageable—foreign policy challenge. In her article, Dr. Rice insightfully writes, “It is useful to remember that Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is neither a permanent enemy nor a strategic threat.”
If President Bush had read Dr. Rice’s article en route to the Olympics, perhaps his ill-advised response to the crisis in Georgia may have been avoided. Such restraint in U.S. foreign policymaking would be both new and realistic.
Patrick Basham is director of the Washington-based Democracy Institute