Russian lawmakers recognize Georgia separatistsBy MANSUR MIROVALEV, Associated Press Writer18 minutes ago
Russia's parliament voted unanimously Monday to urge the president to recognize the independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions, a move likely to stoke further tensions between Moscow and the small Caucasus nation's Western allies.
The votes by both chambers of Russia's parliament, which were not legally binding, come as the White House announced Vice President Dick Cheney would travel to three former Soviet republics next week — Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan.
"Russia's historic role of the guarantor of piece in the Caucasus has increased," said Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the lower chamber. "The Caucasus has always been and will remain the zone of Russia's strategic interests."
The continued presence of Russian troops in Georgia after a lightning war over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has sunk relations between Russia and the West to a post-Cold War low. Western nations have accused Russia of reneging on its commitment to withdraw forces from U.S.-allied Georgia.
The vice president's office described Cheney's trip, which begins Sept. 2 and also includes a stop in Italy, where the U.S. has a major base, only in the broadest terms, saying President Bush wants his No. 2 to consult with key partners on matters of mutual interest.
Experts say the Russian parliament's blessing of the Georgian separatists gives the Kremlin extra leverage as Russia tries to reassert its influence in the former Soviet republics and resist moves by Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.
But it was up to President Dmitry Medvedev to make the final call on establishing full diplomatic relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Currently, neither Russia nor any other member of the United Nations recognizes the two provinces' independence claims. Both won de-facto independence in the 1990s after wars with Georgia, and have survived since with Russia's financial, political and military support.
"Neither Abkhazia ... nor South Ossetia will be part of the Georgian state," Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh told the upper chamber of Russia's parliament Monday.
Despite their desire for independence, one or both regions could eventually be absorbed into Russia.
After Georgia tried to reassert control of South Ossetia by force Aug. 7, Russian troops overwhelmed the Georgians, and for nearly two weeks occupied positions deep within Georgia.
Most of those forces withdrew Friday, although some Russian troops continue to operate near the Black Sea port of Poti and just outside the boundaries of the breakaway regions.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called a special meeting of European Union leaders Sept. 1 to determine what steps the EU will take in terms of aid to Georgia and future relations with Russia. France holds the 27-member bloc's rotating presidency.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, however, said Monday the EU was not considering any sanctions against Moscow.
Russia's critics say the conflict in Georgia heralds a new, worrying era in which an increasingly assertive Kremlin has shown itself ready to resort to military force outside its borders.
On Sunday, a U.S. Navy destroyer loaded with humanitarian aid reached Georgia's Black Sea port of Batumi, bringing baby food, milk, bottled water and a message of support for an embattled ally.
The guided missile cruiser, carrying about 55 tons of humanitarian aid, was the first of three American ships scheduled to arrive this week.
The deputy chief of Russia's general staff suggested Monday the arrival of U.S. and other NATO warships in the Black Sea would increase tensions. Russia shares the sea with NATO members Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria as well as Georgia and Ukraine.
The steps taken by the United States "add another degree to the tension in the region," Anatoly Nogovitsyn said Monday in televised remarks.
A U.S. official said the American ship anchored in Batumi, Georgia's main oil port on the Black Sea, because of concerns about damage to the Georgian port of Poti. Russian troops still hold positions near Poti, and Georgians say the Russians inflicted extensive damage on port facilities there.
In central Georgia, a few miles west of the city of Gori, a fire tore through an oil train after an explosion Sunday, sending plumes of black smoke into the air. The cause was not clear, but Georgians have accused Russian troops of targeting oil facilities and transport links.
Georgia straddles a key westward route for oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other Caspian Sea nations — as the United States and the European Union seek to decrease Russia's dominance of oil and gas exports from the former Soviet Union.
Associated Press Writers Jim Heintz in Tbilisi, Georgia and Maria Danilova in Moscow contributed to this report.
Russia's parliament voted unanimously Monday to urge the president to recognize the independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions, a move likely to stoke further tensions between Moscow and the small Caucasus nation's Western allies.
The votes by both chambers of Russia's parliament, which were not legally binding, come as the White House announced Vice President Dick Cheney would travel to three former Soviet republics next week — Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan.
"Russia's historic role of the guarantor of piece in the Caucasus has increased," said Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the lower chamber. "The Caucasus has always been and will remain the zone of Russia's strategic interests."
The continued presence of Russian troops in Georgia after a lightning war over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has sunk relations between Russia and the West to a post-Cold War low. Western nations have accused Russia of reneging on its commitment to withdraw forces from U.S.-allied Georgia.
The vice president's office described Cheney's trip, which begins Sept. 2 and also includes a stop in Italy, where the U.S. has a major base, only in the broadest terms, saying President Bush wants his No. 2 to consult with key partners on matters of mutual interest.
Experts say the Russian parliament's blessing of the Georgian separatists gives the Kremlin extra leverage as Russia tries to reassert its influence in the former Soviet republics and resist moves by Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.
But it was up to President Dmitry Medvedev to make the final call on establishing full diplomatic relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Currently, neither Russia nor any other member of the United Nations recognizes the two provinces' independence claims. Both won de-facto independence in the 1990s after wars with Georgia, and have survived since with Russia's financial, political and military support.
"Neither Abkhazia ... nor South Ossetia will be part of the Georgian state," Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh told the upper chamber of Russia's parliament Monday.
Despite their desire for independence, one or both regions could eventually be absorbed into Russia.
After Georgia tried to reassert control of South Ossetia by force Aug. 7, Russian troops overwhelmed the Georgians, and for nearly two weeks occupied positions deep within Georgia.
Most of those forces withdrew Friday, although some Russian troops continue to operate near the Black Sea port of Poti and just outside the boundaries of the breakaway regions.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called a special meeting of European Union leaders Sept. 1 to determine what steps the EU will take in terms of aid to Georgia and future relations with Russia. France holds the 27-member bloc's rotating presidency.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, however, said Monday the EU was not considering any sanctions against Moscow.
Russia's critics say the conflict in Georgia heralds a new, worrying era in which an increasingly assertive Kremlin has shown itself ready to resort to military force outside its borders.
On Sunday, a U.S. Navy destroyer loaded with humanitarian aid reached Georgia's Black Sea port of Batumi, bringing baby food, milk, bottled water and a message of support for an embattled ally.
The guided missile cruiser, carrying about 55 tons of humanitarian aid, was the first of three American ships scheduled to arrive this week.
The deputy chief of Russia's general staff suggested Monday the arrival of U.S. and other NATO warships in the Black Sea would increase tensions. Russia shares the sea with NATO members Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria as well as Georgia and Ukraine.
The steps taken by the United States "add another degree to the tension in the region," Anatoly Nogovitsyn said Monday in televised remarks.
A U.S. official said the American ship anchored in Batumi, Georgia's main oil port on the Black Sea, because of concerns about damage to the Georgian port of Poti. Russian troops still hold positions near Poti, and Georgians say the Russians inflicted extensive damage on port facilities there.
In central Georgia, a few miles west of the city of Gori, a fire tore through an oil train after an explosion Sunday, sending plumes of black smoke into the air. The cause was not clear, but Georgians have accused Russian troops of targeting oil facilities and transport links.
Georgia straddles a key westward route for oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and other Caspian Sea nations — as the United States and the European Union seek to decrease Russia's dominance of oil and gas exports from the former Soviet Union.
Associated Press Writers Jim Heintz in Tbilisi, Georgia and Maria Danilova in Moscow contributed to this report.
Russia may hit USA very hard below the belt
25.08.2008 Source: Pravda.
US leading experts analyzed punishing opportunities of both Russia and the West after the recent armed conflict in Georgia. Specialists came to conclusion that the list of potential Western sanctions pales in comparison with what Moscow could do in response. However, the US administration hopes that Russia will not resort to radical measures not to harm its own financial and security interests.
The US administration has issued yet another warning to Moscow recently claiming that Russia’s actions in Georgia would question the future of its WTO bid, as well as Russia’s position in the Group of Eight.
The list of Washington’s threats also includes the blocking of Russia’s membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the boycott of Russia’s hosting of Winter Olympics in 2014 and a freeze of US-Russian strategic dialogue.
US experts warn that the list of Moscow’s potential sanctions is a lot longer. Angela Stent, the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Georgetown University, said that Moscow may respond at the UN Security Council, where it can put obstacles on the way of US intentions to punish Iran for its nuclear ambition. All anti-terrorist programs, the struggle against drug mafia, Syria, Venezuela and Hamas can be added on the list too. There are many questions, on which Russians may stop their cooperation with the USA, with the cooperation in the energy industry on top of that list, the expert believes.
The International Herald Tribune wrote with reference to US outstanding analysts that Washington needed a lot more from Moscow than vice versa. The US needs to ensure the security of Soviet nuclear weapons, to obtain Russia’s help in the endeavor to make Iran and North Korea shut down their nuclear programs.
The sale of Russia’s arms is another problem. The governments of Western countries and Israel are concerned about reports saying that Russia started the shipments of first components of its S-300 missile system to Iran. The latter may subsequently use the powerful systems to down US and Israeli aircraft.
Russia may complicate USA’s and NATO’s supply of the coalition in Afghanistan In April, Moscow gave France and Germany a right to transit non-combatant cargoes via Russia. Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said that the West should not bite the hand that feeds 50,000 servicemen in Afghanistan. Moscow can offer show pressure of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which the USA would like to use for their operations in Afghanistan.
In addition, Russia is capable of blocking any sanctions at the UN Security Council. Moscow can also pull out from a number of disarmament treaties, including the one signed with the USA about the liquidation of short and smaller range missiles after the expiry of START-1 Treaty in 2009.
Flynt Leverett, a former National Security Council senior director and CIA senior analyst, said that Moscow was becoming a very important buyer of US Treasury bonds and US government agency issues. The specialist believes that those officials, who urge Washington to put forward various ultimatums to Russia, would hardly prefer Moscow disposing of its dollar assets. Leverett wrote for The National Interest that Moscow was sounding out opportunities of selling Russian crude for roubles, which would obviously affect long-term dollar positions.
Washington hopes that Russia will not go too far. For example, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and the abrupt devaluation of Russian dollar assets would be highly undesirable for Russia as well. However, Moscow’s further actions will depend on new sanctions of the West that will have to think twice before reacting to possible recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence by Russia.
© 1999-2006. «PRAVDA.Ru». When reproducing our materials in whole or in part, hyperlink to PRAVDA.Ru should be made. The opinions and views of the authors do not always coincide with the point of view of PRAVDA.Ru's editors.
The US administration has issued yet another warning to Moscow recently claiming that Russia’s actions in Georgia would question the future of its WTO bid, as well as Russia’s position in the Group of Eight.
The list of Washington’s threats also includes the blocking of Russia’s membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the boycott of Russia’s hosting of Winter Olympics in 2014 and a freeze of US-Russian strategic dialogue.
US experts warn that the list of Moscow’s potential sanctions is a lot longer. Angela Stent, the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Georgetown University, said that Moscow may respond at the UN Security Council, where it can put obstacles on the way of US intentions to punish Iran for its nuclear ambition. All anti-terrorist programs, the struggle against drug mafia, Syria, Venezuela and Hamas can be added on the list too. There are many questions, on which Russians may stop their cooperation with the USA, with the cooperation in the energy industry on top of that list, the expert believes.
The International Herald Tribune wrote with reference to US outstanding analysts that Washington needed a lot more from Moscow than vice versa. The US needs to ensure the security of Soviet nuclear weapons, to obtain Russia’s help in the endeavor to make Iran and North Korea shut down their nuclear programs.
The sale of Russia’s arms is another problem. The governments of Western countries and Israel are concerned about reports saying that Russia started the shipments of first components of its S-300 missile system to Iran. The latter may subsequently use the powerful systems to down US and Israeli aircraft.
Russia may complicate USA’s and NATO’s supply of the coalition in Afghanistan In April, Moscow gave France and Germany a right to transit non-combatant cargoes via Russia. Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said that the West should not bite the hand that feeds 50,000 servicemen in Afghanistan. Moscow can offer show pressure of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which the USA would like to use for their operations in Afghanistan.
In addition, Russia is capable of blocking any sanctions at the UN Security Council. Moscow can also pull out from a number of disarmament treaties, including the one signed with the USA about the liquidation of short and smaller range missiles after the expiry of START-1 Treaty in 2009.
Flynt Leverett, a former National Security Council senior director and CIA senior analyst, said that Moscow was becoming a very important buyer of US Treasury bonds and US government agency issues. The specialist believes that those officials, who urge Washington to put forward various ultimatums to Russia, would hardly prefer Moscow disposing of its dollar assets. Leverett wrote for The National Interest that Moscow was sounding out opportunities of selling Russian crude for roubles, which would obviously affect long-term dollar positions.
Washington hopes that Russia will not go too far. For example, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and the abrupt devaluation of Russian dollar assets would be highly undesirable for Russia as well. However, Moscow’s further actions will depend on new sanctions of the West that will have to think twice before reacting to possible recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence by Russia.
© 1999-2006. «PRAVDA.Ru». When reproducing our materials in whole or in part, hyperlink to PRAVDA.Ru should be made. The opinions and views of the authors do not always coincide with the point of view of PRAVDA.Ru's editors.
Russia’s reversal: Where next for humanitarian intervention?
By Quentin Peel
Published: August 22 2008 19:49 Last updated: August 22 2008 19:49
On March 24 1999, Sergei Lavrov, then Russia’s long-serving ambassador to the United Nations, issued a forceful defence of national sovereignty. It fell to him to present his government’s outrage at the Nato air strikes that had just been launched against Serbian forces attacking ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
In a scathing performance before the UN Security Council, Mr Lavrov condemned the operation as an offence against international law and demanded that it cease forthwith. “The members of Nato are not entitled to decide the fate of other sovereign and independent states,” he declared. “Attempts to justify the Nato strikes with arguments about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are completely untenable.” He went on to accuse the western allies of blackmail.
Today, as foreign minister in Moscow, Mr Lavrov is using arguments similar to those of Nato in Kosovo, justifying Russia’s attack on neighbouring Georgia as necessary to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia. He and Dmitry Medvedev, his president, have accused Georgia of a massive onslaught on civilians amounting to “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”. Again echoing Nato in Kosovo, Russia has declared its determination to defend the rights of South Ossetians, and the Abkhaz in Georgia’s other secessionist region, to decide their own future.
On the surface, it looks like an extraordinary conversion on the part of a Russian ruling establishment that has long regarded “humanitarian intervention” as a rhetorical fig leaf for American-led military adventurism and has been bitterly opposed to any suggestion of “self-determination” for secessionist minorities in a larger state. Two bitter wars have been fought by the Russian army in Chechnya since the collapse of the Soviet Union to deny just such an outcome.
Others see it as a deliberate exercise to reassert effective Russian control over former Soviet territory, block Nato membership for a country in its “backyard”, and simultaneously expose the hypocrisy of US foreign policy in Kosovo and subsequently in Iraq.
Whatever the justification, the Russian action threatens to disrupt its entire relationship with the US, the European Union and Nato. It may also call into question the fragile international consensus on clear rules for humanitarian intervention, agreed only three years ago by the UN general assembly.
Many Russian commentators argue that the language of humanitarian intervention was abused – particularly by Tony Blair, when UK prime minister – not just in Kosovo but also as belated justification for the war in Iraq. Now, by using the same arguments in Georgia, Russia has left the concept sorely and perhaps deliberately damaged.
“I think it has been profoundly damaged, even before this, because of Iraq and Afghanistan,” says Mary Kaldor, professor of global governance at the London School of Economics. “The tragedy is that there is a case for limited humanitarian intervention, but this middle position is very difficult to hold on to. This conflict will make it even harder.”
The idea of codifying rules for humanitarian intervention was first raised by Kofi Annan, the former UN secretary-general, in a lecture to the UK-based Ditchley Foundation in 1998. “Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading,” he said.
Mr Blair took up the idea with enthusiasm while the Kosovo conflict was still under way. “This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand,” he told the Chicago Economic Club in April, 1999, calling such intervention a new “doctrine of the international community”.
It took another six years for Mr Annan to win support, on the basis of recommendations by his high-level panel on UN reform, for the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P in diplomatic jargon) initiative. It was seen as the most important reform agreed – unanimously – by all the countries that attended the UN general assembly in 2005. It made up for a failure to agree any changes in the make-up of the UN Security Council itself.
Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and president of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, was one of the architects of the R2P concept. He rejects the idea that the Russian intervention in Georgia qualifies under that heading.
“Even though it has been characterised in R2P terms, this is not really about protection of civilians but protection of [Russian] nationals,” he says. “That has been the basis for all sorts of interventions in the past that were not humanitarian.
“This was not a situation with a risk of mass atrocity crimes. It is not one that meets the precautionary criteria [for R2P] that we defined.”
Those criteria include a just cause – imminent danger of ethnic cleansing or a large-scale loss of life, for example. All peaceful alternatives to military intervention must have been exhausted and use of force must be proportional. Any such intervention also requires legal authority, ideally from the UN Security Council. “You have got to be really careful how you apply this,” says Mr Evans. “You cannot play ducks and drakes with the criteria.”
In the case of South Ossetia, he argues, the seriousness of the situation was “not so obvious as to justify prima facie military force”, peaceful alternatives had not been exhausted and the response was not proportional.
Dmitry Kosyrev, a political commentator with the semi-official Russian news agency, RIA-Novosti, retorts that “sending armed forces into the territory of a sovereign state without the UN’s authorisation, so called ‘humanitarian intervention’ ”, is an American invention.
. . .Mr Blair’s belated use of humanitarian arguments to justify the war in Iraq also undermined the cause. “There would have been a strong case for humanitarian intervention in Iraq if it had happened in 1988, when the Kurds were being gassed,” says Edward Mortimer, senior vice-president of the Salzburg Global Seminar and former speech-writer to Mr Annan. “Having not intervened then, to say we were involved in a humanitarian intervention 15 years later” was less credible.
David Malone, president of Canada’s International Development Research Center and an author on past interventions, says there is a constant confusion “between the notion of humanitarian intervention as a military operation, to impose assistance for victims of conflict, and the peaceful provision of assistance. Thoughtful people in favour of the latter are very cautious about the former.”
When asked to cite a successful example of humanitarian intervention, he can name only tiny Sierra Leone in west Africa, where UN peacekeepers, with backing from British troops, managed to bring stability over a long period. In Darfur, where the international community has been strongly criticised for its failure to intervene more forcefully, “there has never been any serious discussion about western military intervention. The scale of the military challenge is overwhelming.”
Indeed, failed interventions have also proved devastating. In Somalia in 1992-93, for example, US troops suffered grievous casualties and withdrew – a big factor in the subsequent refusal of Washington and many others to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
On the other hand, there has been one recent intervention that fits the R2P criteria and has so far been a notable success: stopping the threat of ethnic warfare in Kenya after that country’s disputed election last year. “That was a real R2P situation where we did not need military intervention, because there was peaceful negotiation in time,” says Mr Evans.
Mr Annan brokered a power-sharing agreement in Kenya between Mwai Kibaki, the president, and Raila Odinga, now prime minister. “When we talk of intervention, people think of the military. But under R2P, force is a last resort. I think we have seen a successful example of its application [in Kenya],” he told The New York Times.
That is a hopeful example. But Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish president and now head of the Crisis Management Group, an organisation specialising in conflict resolution, says there is a more profound problem. “Why can’t we get more countries to support European positions?” he asks. “Because we have allowed too many frozen conflicts to remain just that: frozen.
“Why do we let the Sri Lankans fight, and we don’t do a damn thing? I don’t say we should intervene militarily, but we should do something. Darfur is a failure, I agree, but far more serious are the conflicts that have been there for ages, such as Kashmir.
“Above all, our credibility as the west is very much geared to starting to solve finally the Middle East conflict. Everyone knows that is central.”
The Financial Times Limited 250808
Published: August 22 2008 19:49 Last updated: August 22 2008 19:49
On March 24 1999, Sergei Lavrov, then Russia’s long-serving ambassador to the United Nations, issued a forceful defence of national sovereignty. It fell to him to present his government’s outrage at the Nato air strikes that had just been launched against Serbian forces attacking ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
In a scathing performance before the UN Security Council, Mr Lavrov condemned the operation as an offence against international law and demanded that it cease forthwith. “The members of Nato are not entitled to decide the fate of other sovereign and independent states,” he declared. “Attempts to justify the Nato strikes with arguments about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are completely untenable.” He went on to accuse the western allies of blackmail.
Today, as foreign minister in Moscow, Mr Lavrov is using arguments similar to those of Nato in Kosovo, justifying Russia’s attack on neighbouring Georgia as necessary to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia. He and Dmitry Medvedev, his president, have accused Georgia of a massive onslaught on civilians amounting to “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”. Again echoing Nato in Kosovo, Russia has declared its determination to defend the rights of South Ossetians, and the Abkhaz in Georgia’s other secessionist region, to decide their own future.
On the surface, it looks like an extraordinary conversion on the part of a Russian ruling establishment that has long regarded “humanitarian intervention” as a rhetorical fig leaf for American-led military adventurism and has been bitterly opposed to any suggestion of “self-determination” for secessionist minorities in a larger state. Two bitter wars have been fought by the Russian army in Chechnya since the collapse of the Soviet Union to deny just such an outcome.
Others see it as a deliberate exercise to reassert effective Russian control over former Soviet territory, block Nato membership for a country in its “backyard”, and simultaneously expose the hypocrisy of US foreign policy in Kosovo and subsequently in Iraq.
Whatever the justification, the Russian action threatens to disrupt its entire relationship with the US, the European Union and Nato. It may also call into question the fragile international consensus on clear rules for humanitarian intervention, agreed only three years ago by the UN general assembly.
Many Russian commentators argue that the language of humanitarian intervention was abused – particularly by Tony Blair, when UK prime minister – not just in Kosovo but also as belated justification for the war in Iraq. Now, by using the same arguments in Georgia, Russia has left the concept sorely and perhaps deliberately damaged.
“I think it has been profoundly damaged, even before this, because of Iraq and Afghanistan,” says Mary Kaldor, professor of global governance at the London School of Economics. “The tragedy is that there is a case for limited humanitarian intervention, but this middle position is very difficult to hold on to. This conflict will make it even harder.”
The idea of codifying rules for humanitarian intervention was first raised by Kofi Annan, the former UN secretary-general, in a lecture to the UK-based Ditchley Foundation in 1998. “Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading,” he said.
Mr Blair took up the idea with enthusiasm while the Kosovo conflict was still under way. “This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand,” he told the Chicago Economic Club in April, 1999, calling such intervention a new “doctrine of the international community”.
It took another six years for Mr Annan to win support, on the basis of recommendations by his high-level panel on UN reform, for the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P in diplomatic jargon) initiative. It was seen as the most important reform agreed – unanimously – by all the countries that attended the UN general assembly in 2005. It made up for a failure to agree any changes in the make-up of the UN Security Council itself.
Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and president of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, was one of the architects of the R2P concept. He rejects the idea that the Russian intervention in Georgia qualifies under that heading.
“Even though it has been characterised in R2P terms, this is not really about protection of civilians but protection of [Russian] nationals,” he says. “That has been the basis for all sorts of interventions in the past that were not humanitarian.
“This was not a situation with a risk of mass atrocity crimes. It is not one that meets the precautionary criteria [for R2P] that we defined.”
Those criteria include a just cause – imminent danger of ethnic cleansing or a large-scale loss of life, for example. All peaceful alternatives to military intervention must have been exhausted and use of force must be proportional. Any such intervention also requires legal authority, ideally from the UN Security Council. “You have got to be really careful how you apply this,” says Mr Evans. “You cannot play ducks and drakes with the criteria.”
In the case of South Ossetia, he argues, the seriousness of the situation was “not so obvious as to justify prima facie military force”, peaceful alternatives had not been exhausted and the response was not proportional.
Dmitry Kosyrev, a political commentator with the semi-official Russian news agency, RIA-Novosti, retorts that “sending armed forces into the territory of a sovereign state without the UN’s authorisation, so called ‘humanitarian intervention’ ”, is an American invention.
. . .Mr Blair’s belated use of humanitarian arguments to justify the war in Iraq also undermined the cause. “There would have been a strong case for humanitarian intervention in Iraq if it had happened in 1988, when the Kurds were being gassed,” says Edward Mortimer, senior vice-president of the Salzburg Global Seminar and former speech-writer to Mr Annan. “Having not intervened then, to say we were involved in a humanitarian intervention 15 years later” was less credible.
David Malone, president of Canada’s International Development Research Center and an author on past interventions, says there is a constant confusion “between the notion of humanitarian intervention as a military operation, to impose assistance for victims of conflict, and the peaceful provision of assistance. Thoughtful people in favour of the latter are very cautious about the former.”
When asked to cite a successful example of humanitarian intervention, he can name only tiny Sierra Leone in west Africa, where UN peacekeepers, with backing from British troops, managed to bring stability over a long period. In Darfur, where the international community has been strongly criticised for its failure to intervene more forcefully, “there has never been any serious discussion about western military intervention. The scale of the military challenge is overwhelming.”
Indeed, failed interventions have also proved devastating. In Somalia in 1992-93, for example, US troops suffered grievous casualties and withdrew – a big factor in the subsequent refusal of Washington and many others to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
On the other hand, there has been one recent intervention that fits the R2P criteria and has so far been a notable success: stopping the threat of ethnic warfare in Kenya after that country’s disputed election last year. “That was a real R2P situation where we did not need military intervention, because there was peaceful negotiation in time,” says Mr Evans.
Mr Annan brokered a power-sharing agreement in Kenya between Mwai Kibaki, the president, and Raila Odinga, now prime minister. “When we talk of intervention, people think of the military. But under R2P, force is a last resort. I think we have seen a successful example of its application [in Kenya],” he told The New York Times.
That is a hopeful example. But Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish president and now head of the Crisis Management Group, an organisation specialising in conflict resolution, says there is a more profound problem. “Why can’t we get more countries to support European positions?” he asks. “Because we have allowed too many frozen conflicts to remain just that: frozen.
“Why do we let the Sri Lankans fight, and we don’t do a damn thing? I don’t say we should intervene militarily, but we should do something. Darfur is a failure, I agree, but far more serious are the conflicts that have been there for ages, such as Kashmir.
“Above all, our credibility as the west is very much geared to starting to solve finally the Middle East conflict. Everyone knows that is central.”
The Financial Times Limited 250808
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